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I. Executive Summary 
 
 
Since its accession into the European Union in 2007, Romania has consistently fallen 
short of its development objectives for the 2007-2013 period. Of particular concern is Romania’s 
repeated failure to obtain sufficient and sustainable fiscal and financial resources for domestic 
development. While discussion and analysis of underlying problems has been prolific, the 
obscurity, generality, and uncoordinated nature of proposed solutions continue to hinder 
progress.1 With these shortcomings in mind, this paper uses case studies, personal interviews, and 
policy analysis to examine two key aspects of development finance: EU funds absorption, and 
development banking. Following the examination are specific recommendations on how Romania 
should address the issues at hand in order to improve development financing over the 2014 – 
2020 period.  
 
Regarding EU funds, steps to mimic the successful absorption models of Poland and 
Czech Republic through regionalization of fund management have failed due to insufficient inter-
party dialogue, political deadlock, barriers to skills diffusion, and inadequate resources for 
monitoring. The evidence suggests that instead of regionalization, a centralized and coordinated 
approach to EU fund management should be taken via management authority consolidation. 
Additionally, clear priorities for EU fund use and a set of best practices regarding risk assessment 
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should be implemented so that banks, applicants, and government ministries are on the same 
page in terms of project acceptability.  
 
To facilitate transparent, coordinated, and successful EU funds use, management should 
be consolidated into two development banks. While capitalizing a new bank would be difficult, if 
not infeasible, the existing capital and financial infrastructure vested in the two public banks, 
ExIm Bank and CEC Bank, is sufficient to meet current needs. Specifically, ExIm Bank should 
expand operations and take on the role of managing authority for funds allocated to long-term 
infrastructure development, export-oriented SMEs, and long-term agricultural investment. CEC 
Bank should take on the role of managing authority for funds allocated to human capital 
development, agriculture, and domestic SMEs. The transition should begin with ExIm Bank as a 
two-year trial and be expanded to CEC Bank, which presently faces greater volatility in terms of 
stakeholder view of future operations. 
 
 
 
II. European Funds: Fortune or Fiasco? 
 
 
 
Romania’s accession into the EU in 2007 paired with the global financial crisis ushered in 
a period of rapid change for the Romanian economy. A generation of privatization and 
subsequent reliance on foreign capital led Romania into period of vulnerable and dependent 
growth (Gabor, 2012; Ban, 2013). In the period of prosperity prior to 2008, Romania privatized 
and sold its national development bank Banca Română pentru Dezvoltare (BRD) in 1999, 
increased the role of foreign investment in development, and altered its tax code to promote FDI. 
This tactic granted Romania a period of substantial growth, until the global financial crisis 
resulted in a sudden stop to foreign finance, which, apart from diminishing both domestic 
consumption and investment, put significant pressure on the Romanian tax base and public 
budget (Voinea, 2012; Daianu et al., 2011).  
 
While efficiently boosting effective taxation is an important step toward sustainably 
financing the public budget, it is an example of an area where the current position taken by the 
Romanian government is on track to meet its defined goals. Instead of dwelling on this issue, this 
report tackles an aspect of development funding that is far from being on track and represents one 
of the most severe impediments to Romania’s successful short- to mid-term development: 
European funds absorption. Currently, Romania has the lowest funding absorption rate of any 
EU member state. More shocking is the comparison between EU funded project approval and 
EU funding that is actually disbursed. 2  One reason for this disparity has been a lack of 
coordination between banks managing loans to applicants and the managing authorities 
approving projects. Until recently, approval could be granted by a government managing 
authority and then when the project was sent for funding to a bank, it was rejected due to not 
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passing adequate risk assessment criteria.3 To try and account for this, banks began issuing letters 
of assurance that demonstrated that a particular program had passed its risk assessment and that 
if the government then approved a project it would be able to get funding. While this has helped 
to ensure that applicants visit banks before proceeding to the government, coordination between 
the two entities is severely lacking (Wegener, 2013). Even the public banks, CEC Bank and ExIm 
Bank, have experienced confusion and lacking coordination in regards to the project approval 
process of the public managing authorities.4  
 
To try and improve the EU funding process the Romanian government adopted the 
successful Polish and Czech models for EU fund management, allowing regional development 
offices to act as managing authorities for EU funded projects and expanding local and state 
government co-financing of projects up to 80%.5 Additionally, the Ministry of European Funds 
was created in 2011 and recently, under Minister Eugen Teodorovici, has achieved a 26% 
absorption rate in November of 2013, up from 10.6% in 2011.6 Despite these clear gains, 
likelihood of Romania advancing beyond 35% absorption under current institutions is low and 
most successes have come at the state, rather than regional level. One reason is that Romania’s 
astonishing absorption growth rate over the 2012-2013 period was largely due to correcting 
already approved applications so that banks would grant funding, or negotiating with the 
European Union to return 2.6 billion euros that the EU initially approved, but halted due to 
suspicion of fund misuse (Romania Insider, 2013).  Thus, while a step in the right direction, this in 
no way predicates similar absorption increases over the next years. Additionally the decentralized 
Polish and Czech regional models for EU fund management have not been successfully enacted 
in Romania for other reasons including prevalence of regional corruption and politically non-
homogeneous growth regions (Alexandru, 2012; Wegener, 2013; Matei et al. 2012). While anti-
corruption watchdogs have been prominent at the level of the central government, local politics 
are much more prone to corruption in Romania (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013; Pop et al., 2013). 
Additionally, disagreements between economic centers and surrounding communities over the 
proper use of EU funds has led to political deadlock, numerous unapproved applications for 
funding, and an inability to prioritize fund use due to political disagreement.7 Thus, the adoption 
of the regionalized Polish model has not proven successful in Romania and nearly all successful 
EU funds acquisition during the post-crisis period has been at the state level via the Ministry of 
EU funds (Mihailescu, 2012).  
What is additionally worrisome is that Romania is lacking clearly defined goals directed 
at how to use the funds for long-term inclusive development. A recent report found that Romania 
has yet to solidify a plan for the organized spending of EU funds beyond the end of 2013 
(Mihailescu, 2013). Such a lack in foresight and coordination is likely due to the politicization of 
EU funds and the fragmented and uncoordinated policy of regionalization. With this in mind, it is 
evident that something needs to be done in terms of Romania’s management of EU funds. 
Initially examining Romania’s managing authority layout shows that it has a relatively low 
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number of managing authorities at six (European Commission, 2012). However, all other 
countries report each regional office as a managing authority, while Romania does not, even 
though in actuality this is the case. Thus, given Romania’s eight additional primary regional 
development offices it has a total of fourteen managing authorities putting it in the top third of all 
countries in terms of number of managing authorities and significantly higher than most countries 
with similar GDP and allocated funding.8 
Given Romania’s political reputation for lacking coordination between ministries, 
redundant management structures, and institutional overlap this model of fund management is 
both inefficient and unsustainable if Romania wants to hit its absorption targets over the 2014-
2020 period (Wegener, 2011). In fact, a 2012 study by Matei and Dogaru finds that Romanian 
policy coordination, while appearing to exist in formal language, does not manifest itself in 
practical policy implementation (Matei et al., 2012). In place of this structure, following the 
absorption tactics of Slovenia and Estonia, having one centralized management authority would 
better address the needs of coordinated, prioritized, and efficient mid- to long-term development. 
France has even employed such a tactic of entity consolidation for its new national development 
bank (Bpifrance, 2013). Additionally, the Romanian government presently approves projects on 
more or less a first-come, first-serve basis without regard to a clearly defined “bigger picture” of 
development and without prioritizing applications with the potential for maximal positive external 
spillovers. Such a lack of foresight defeats the aim of EU funds as, not a source of quick financing 
for haphazard growth endeavors, but a source of long-term and convergence-oriented 
development financing aimed at bolstering inclusive growth.  
While, the Ministry of European Funds has already demonstrated that there are certain 
benefits to a more centralized structure, there are also many potential problems. These include 
the continued politicization of EU funds management with representative minorities not having 
much say in fund allocation, the potential for cronyism between ministry officials and recipients of 
large funding projects, a lack of distribution infrastructure at the state-level to allow rural 
establishments access to funding, and an inability for the public sector to offer wages high enough 
to keep skilled finance and development experts in positions for an extended period of time. All of 
these problems are serious and real. It is for these reasons that examining alternatives for EU 
funds management outside of political institutions is both recommended and essential. The most 
natural place to look in order to boost coordination between finance and government project 
approval is at the public banks: ExIm Bank and CEC Bank. Turning initial control of EU fund 
management over to these two banks and giving them quasi-independent status with a clear and 
defined mandate for EU funds use, is perhaps the most salient solution to the problem of EU 
funds management given the extensive skills, experience, distribution infrastructure, and financial 
success that these banks have had without state-support in the wake of the financial crisis (CEC 
Bank, 2013; BNR, 2013).9 Thus, the following section describes in detail the rationale and process 
for generating a branch of each of these two organizations to jointly act as managing authority for 
EU funds and a development bank to help to promote longer-term and sustainable finance for 
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SMEs, infrastructure, agriculture, education, and the overall Romanian economy in line with 
Romania’s defined sustainable development goals and the stated objectives attached to EU funds.  
 
IV. A Development Banking Solution for Romania 
  
Until 1999 Romania had a successful public development bank, BRD, that was privatized, 
sold to French investors, and now functions purely in a commercial capacity.  While Romania still 
has two public banks CEC Bank and ExIm Bank, they differ from a traditional development bank 
in terms of their individual mandates, their ability to directly manage development funds, and the 
time horizon of many of their projects. While different, these two banks possess the seed capital, 
skills, regulatory requirements, and infrastructure needed for successful development coordination 
and EU fund management. Additionally, the economic and feasibility perception of development 
banks has drastically changed since the 1970s with agencies such as the World Bank and United 
Nations, as well as Harvard Business School researchers now supporting a new generation of 
development banks as a means both of long term development coordination and countercyclical 
lending (Scott, 2007; Lazzarini, 2012; United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2005; World Bank, 2013).  
While the history of development banking is a turbulent one with instances of both great 
success and great failure, modern development banks have often learned from past failures; taking 
away lessons in transparency, regulation, and risk assessment. In a study of 90 development banks 
in 16 countries by the World Bank, results showed that 64% of development banks were below 
the national average in terms of non-performing loans, 86% were profitable, and 53% had 
returns on assets exceeding average private sector banks (De Luna-Martinez, 2012). To specify 
success, a study conducted by the development planning division of the Development Bank of 
South Africa, identifies specific traits and characteristics that have allowed development banks to 
succeed.10 These traits include: having a clear mandate, being supervised by the same bodies 
regulating private financial institutions, being held to high standards of transparency, having 
adequate initial capitalization, having strong internal governance, an independent board, and 
regular transparent assessment (Thorne, 2009; Vicente, 2012; Schapiro, 2012; da Silva, 2013; 
Hochstetler, 2013; Rudolph, 2011).   
Relevant case studies in terms of both success and specific characteristics that can be 
implemented by ExIm Bank and CEC Bank in expanding to take on the joint role of national 
development bank are those of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BNDES), the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development (HBOR), the 
Public Investment Bank of France (Bpifrance), and China Development Bank (CDB). Three key 
areas will be examined using these banks as examples of successful behavior: long-term 
profitability and risk diversification ability, successful management of EU funds, and coexistence 
with private banking sector and EU regulations.  
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For profitability and risk diversification, no better examples exist than the China 
Development Bank and the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development. As 
evidenced from both banks, a state-run bank can operate with consistent financial success while 
also promoting growth and managing state development financing. A study of BNDES found that 
BNDES chooses its clients based on the same types of risk-assessment processes that commercial 
banks do, with some additional leeway given by capital meant to service higher risk investments 
(Lazzarini et al., 2012; da Silva, 2013; Hochstetler, 2013).11 Additionally, there is no evidence to 
support that BNDES systematically bails out non-performing firms or interferes with the 
operational structure of successful firms that it loans to (Lazzarini et. al., 2012). The reason for 
BNDES success is likely due to its stringent transparency requirements, clear development 
mandate, high level of skilled employees, and subjection to the same regulatory body as the 
Brazilian financial system (Schapiro, 2012). The China Development Bank also has clearly 
defined risk assessment criteria for all types of potential risk exposure and uses a risk-adjusted 
return on capital approach to optimize performance. Such tactics have led the China 
Development Bank to become consistently profitable, and achieve a non-performing loan ratio of 
just 1% (China Development Bank, 2005).  While achieving the scale and scope of these leading 
development banks is beyond immediate future possibility for Romania, their models for 
demonstrate clear paths to success rely on sound risk assessment and diversification training, a 
tangible and clear mission statement, and a variety of sources for development financing. To 
better visualize the scale of a Romanian development bank, it is possible to compare the asset 
share of BNDES with the asset share of CEC Bank. Such a comparison shows that BNDES 
comprises of about 10% of total banking assets in the Brazilian economy while CEC Bank 
comprises about 7% of banking assets in the Romanian economy (BNR, 2013).12 This means that, 
in terms of relative size, a combined development bank composed of ExIm Bank and CEC Bank 
would be only slightly smaller compared with total banking assets in Romania than BNDES is in 
Brazil.  
Given past performance, it is evident that ExIm Bank and CEC Bank already possess 
many early signals for future success in development banking in terms of risk assessment 
experience, a clearly defined mission statement, and previously demonstrated profitability, even 
during a financial crisis period. Such pre-existing proof of performance and demonstrated success 
is rarely available when setting up a national development bank and thus, Romania has a high 
potential for national development banking success. Additionally, given the Romanian public 
banks’ combined capital share of 8% and unique ability to use existing capital and EU funds as an 
initial means to begin expanding funding opportunities for appropriate development activities 
means that additional government support would not likely be needed.13 In the future, as both 
BNDES and the CDB have done, a Romanian development bank could issue special 
development bonds on European financial markets to raise additional capital. Such fundraising 
may be presently feasible given the two banks’ history of success and Romania’s attractiveness to 
foreign investment. In sum, both BNDES and the CDB demonstrate that state-run national 
development banks can be financially successful while still provide previously non-existent credit 
opportunities during times of crisis, which is important because existing public banks in Romania 
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demonstrate early signals of potential success as highlighted by these leading development 
banking institutions.   
In terms of specifically handling EU funds, Croatia’s state development bank HBOR, 
provides an example of a development institution that was responsible for successfully managing 
pre-accession funds through second-tier lending to other commercial banks in Croatia. Through 
its unified assessment of risk and selection of projects to be approved on strict criteria of meeting 
EU standards, HBOR successfully handled EU funds through Instruments for Pre-accession 
Assistance allowing it to absorb over 70% of its pre-accession funds by 2012 and in 2011 was still 
significantly ahead of nearly all Eastern European countries in terms of absorption rate of 
European funds (HBOR, 2013).14 Such success could be replicated in Romania, especially when 
most of the necessary banking infrastructure is already in place via CEC Bank (CEC Bank, 2013). 
The importance for the Croatian case is that HBOR worked directly with public banks and both 
the government of Croatia and the European Union to efficiently manage EU funds in a 
centralized and linear fashion. Private banks could get access to EU funds for approved projects 
through HBOR and the proper channel for EU funds application was clearly defined (HBOR, 
2013). This is not the case in Romania. Until recently, the immense regionalization of EU funds 
generated confusion and overlap of funding activities (Alexandru et al. 2012). Applications were 
sent to the government, approved for funding, and then rejected by banks due to a lack of risk 
assessment.15 Croatia clarified this issue by creating a clean channel for funding applications that 
utilized HBOR’s risk assessment procedure on the government end to avoid superfluous 
government approval of programs that were unlikely to succeed (HBOR, 2013). While Croatia 
has only recently joined the European Union, its success in handling EU sponsored pre-accession 
funds should be internalized by the Romanian government. While plans of regionalization of EU 
funds have worked in other countries including Czech Republic and Poland, Croatia provides 
demonstrated success of the alternative, a more centralized and less political approach to handling 
funds from the European Union.  
The third key topic to examine is coexistence with private banking sector and EU 
regulations. While regulations of the European Union prohibit state run national development 
banks that impede competition, are overly protectionist, or that rely solely on government aid, a 
new type of development institution, France’s Banque publique d'investissement (Bpifrance), 
demonstrates that new development banks in the European Union are a possibility and important, 
even for successful and developed member states. Bpifrance is a new development bank founded 
in 2013 and under joint ownership of the state of France and the Caisse des Dépôts (Bpifrance, 
2013). It was created in order to more efficiently provide funding for technological innovation, 
developing enterprises, and the social economy by combining the services previously provide by 
the OSEO, a bank lending to SMEs and R&D, CDC Entreprises, and the Strategic Investment 
Fund (FSI). The purpose of this merger is to create a more efficient and centralized channel for all 
development financing so that long-term development goals can be coordinated over a broader 
scope of projects and so that parties interested in accessing funds have an efficient and simplified 
one-stop shop rather than several overlapping institutions (Bpifrance, 2013).  
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Bpifrance, thus, has several traits important to a future Romanian development bank: it is 
built from previously existing institutions, it is grounded in the idea of boosting coordination and 
consolidating institutions, and it has been accepted by the European Union as a legitimate 
development bank. The baseline model for Bpifrance comes from early models of Germany’s 
KfW, and consolidates regional development finances while still having elected regional 
representation on the board of governors to protect regional interests (Bpifrance, 2013). Romania 
has the potential to mimic this model in setting up its own development bank by creating an 
overlapping branch between CEC Bank and ExIm Bank which consolidates the management of 
state funds for regional development as well as EU funds with funds derived from existing bank 
capital. As Bpifrance seeks to do, this would give parties in Romania access to a depoliticized and 
one-stop shop for development financing which would greatly improve efficiency and ease of EU 
funds accession. Additionally, Bpifrance seeks to improve coordination of development funds in 
France to meet national development goals (Bpifrance, 2013). This provides an example of a 
developed and successful EU member state establishing a development bank for the expressed 
purposes of development coordination and increased efficiency of development financing. Such 
goals are also desired in Romania, and thus Bpifrance provides another model for successfully 
consolidating existing organizations and capital into a new type of centralized and consolidated 
development bank. The result would be one entity that can specialize and focus on optimal 
development finance to meet both short and long-term national development objectives. 
Additionally, being a bank subject to the restrictions and regulations of other private banks in 
Romania and with close ties to both the private financial sector and government should help to 
prevent political hijacking of such an institution.  
While one of the biggest difficulties identified by new development banks is adequately 
diversifying and assessing risk, both CEC bank and ExIm Bank have experience and skills in this 
area and neither institution required any kind of aid from the Romanian government during the 
global financial crisis.16 Additionally, both CEC Bank and ExIm Bank reported non-performing 
loan (NPL) ratios below national averages in the post-crisis period (CEC Bank, 2013; National 
Bank of Romania, 2013). Specifically, comparing the third quarter figures for 2013 of CEC Bank, 
who owns 7% of total banking sector assets, to other leading private banks in terms of NPL ratios 
clearly shows that CEC bank’s 19.5% NPL ratio is not only below the national average of 21.56%, 
but also below BCR at 29.2%, BRD at 24.41% and Banca Transilvania at 20.3% (Popescu, 2013; 
Nadasan, 2013, CEC Bank, 2013, National Bank of Romania, 2013, BRD 2013, Business Review 
2013).17 Such performance paired with consistent profitability and an under-performing private 
banking sector is sound evidence in support CEC Bank’s continued public ownership and a 
potential signal of future success in larger-scale development banking. This success can be 
visualized by CEC Bank’s four consecutive year receipt of the ANEIR Grand Prize for banking 
excellence in the post-recession period (CEC Bank, 2013).  
While facing opposing criticism on whether to remain public or privatize from the 
National Bank of Romania, Ministry of Public Finance, and private stakeholders, CEC Bank has 
not formally commented on its willingness to or ability to expand its role to acting as a national 
development bank. ExIm Bank, albeit smaller at only about 1% of total banking sector assets, has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Interview	  with	  official	  at	  ExIm	  Bank	  and	  CEC	  Bank.	  November,	  2013.	  
17	  See	  Appendix	  Figure	  #5	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stated that it currently possesses the required skills, seed capital, and corporate management 
structure that would allow it to immediately take on the role of a development bank with specific 
foci on long-term infrastructure investment, export-oriented agricultural projects, and SMEs, if 
the Romanian government would legally grant this expansion of scope.18 For long-term and 
sustainable development banking to be a success in Romania, however, CEC Bank must be 
included and expanded to take on the role of development bank in terms of smaller scale SME 
and rural development funding as CEC Bank’s infrastructure is more expansive and focused on 
rural development than ExIm Bank. While the assets of ExIm Bank alone are not enough to be 
considered comparable to other successful development banks, the combined assets of CEC Bank 
and ExIm Bank, in addition to assets derived from EU Funds and state development finances 
would be.19 
Some problems may arise in terms of CEC Bank’s ability and willingness to take on this 
task given the instability of stakeholder perception of where the bank should be headed. After 
several successive quarters of stagnant profits, many have called for CEC Bank’s privatization, 
even though it has consistently outperformed many private banks during the crisis and post-crisis 
period (CEC Bank, 2013; BNR, 2013). Such instability, however, could be detrimental to a large 
expansion of development financing activities and EU fund involvement, which is why initial 
policy should be piloted with ExIm Bank with the discussion and plans to phase in CEC Bank. 
Additional criticism of development banking that needs to be addressed include: propping up 
non-competitive enterprises, lack of financial profitability outside of state-funding, inexperienced 
risk assessment techniques, unregulated state control of development finances, lack of elected 
representation in finances, and inability to attract qualified long-term employees (Schapiro, 2012, 
Hochstetler, 2013). While these criticisms have been quashed for leading development banks such 
as BNDES and CDB, a Romanian development bank will have to prove itself. Utilizing CEC 
Bank and ExIm Bank’s resources and skills should ensure profitability, adequate risk assessment 
procedures, and qualified employees however several recommendations are necessary to ensure 
that the other criticisms of public development banking are not realized.  
Pivotal recommendations for successful development banking in Romania include 
government provision of ExIm Bank, and subsequently CEC Bank, with a defined mission to act 
in part as a platform for regional development as well as coordinated national development in line 
with the pre-defined targets of EU funds, emphasis on investments with maximal positive external 
spillovers, and long-term goal of eventual convergence to EU standards. The management of EU 
funds that relate to infrastructure, export-oriented SMEs, larger-scale agriculture, and research 
and development should then be consolidated into a development banking branch of ExIm Bank. 
Management of EU funds relating to and human capital, agriculture, and domestic SMEs should 
be consolidated into a branch of CEC Bank. These two branches should be required to meet and 
file joint progress reports of activities to ensure communication is maintained between the two 
groups. When government ministries or other individuals and institutions seek EU funds for 
projects, they must approach one of these two banks for funding and should be subject to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Interview	  with	  official	  at	  ExIm	  Bank.	  November,	  2013.	  
19	  See	  Appendix	  Figure	  #6	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same risk assessment and goal-alignment procedures that private beneficiaries are subject to in 
order to limit wasteful and non-productive spending.  
The main goal of this banking system is to depoliticize and coordinate EU funds use by 
placing them in an institution with quasi-independent management and behavior, such as is the 
case with the National Bank of Romania (BNR). These banks also have a standardized set of risk 
assessment and prioritization procedures to allow for greater absorption potential and also both 
minimize overlap in development activities while maximizing positive external spillovers. The 
mandate for these institutions must remain explicit and public in order for elected officials to 
monitor and be able to publically criticize the institution if it veers from its objective. Such a 
mandate is crucial as it will allow elected officials and the populations that they represent to act as 
a check on a national development bank and not be separated from it (Schapiro, 2012). In 
Romania’s case, two institutions instead of one should be used due to the different natures of 
loans, the varied expertise present at each organization, and the varied nature of project types in 
terms of length, risk diversification potential, and the counseling needs of potential clients. A 
division of skills between these two institutions, permitted adequate trans-institution discussion 
occurs, would thus be ideal to offer maximally relevant and targeted service to potential customers. 
Additionally, monetary incentives should be offered both for merit and length of employment at 
these institutions ensuring that long-term and skilled workers remain in this sector, as the rapid 
loss of skilled development practitioners and EU funds experts in the Romanian public sector has 
severely hampered the ability of the Romanian government to adequately apply for and 
successfully absorb EU funds.20  
Additionally, The same boards and regulatory bodies that regulate and monitor the 
private Romanian financial system will monitor these branches and they will be subject to 
inspection by Romanian anti-corruption panels to limit the potential for institutionalized 
corruption and unwarranted exclusion of eligible applicants. Ideally, an independent body would 
also be formed to ensure the development bank is meeting adequate transparency standards. To 
this end, following Bulgaria’s example, all records and financing activities for EU funds must be 
recorded digitally and be made publically available online along with relevant supporting 
documents and the results of intermittent progress reports (Alexandru, 2012).  The membership of 
both banks in the Romanian Banking Association (ARB) will also necessitate communication and 
connection with one another as well as the private sector, while government shareholding will also 
enable government input into development financing. All of these recommendations combined 
with the demonstrated success of case study examples should dispel criticism of the possibility for 
development banking success in Romania.  
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V. Concluding Recommendations 
 
 The case studies in development banking ranging from Brazil to France and from China 
to Croatia all exemplify aspects of successful institutions that have key traits within reach of the 
Romanian public banks. These traits include: clearly defined mandates, a sizeable share of total 
assets, demonstrated profitability, risk assessment techniques similar to the private sector, a quasi-
independent nature, subjection to a regulatory body, and separation from political volatility. 
Further data from personal interviews, government documents, and academic literature suggest 
that a diffusion of control over EU funds management is a major component contributing to low 
EU funds absorption and slow convergence toward EU standards. Establishing a national 
development bank responsible for all EU funds that is housed in both CEC Bank and ExIm Bank 
provides one solution to this problem of EU fund absorption and coordinated development. 
Looking specifically at what others have done in a European Union context demonstrates that 
both France and Croatia have found that consolidation of entities is an efficient and effective way 
to carry out development financing. Additionally, outside of the EU, the bpifrance model for 
development banking shares many common traits for success with other leading national 
development banks. Thus, in order for Romania to realize its goals in terms of financing 
development in the 2014-2020 period and progressing toward convergence with European 
standards it should:  
 
Ø Centralize and depoliticize the management of EU funds by consolidating the 
numerous managing authorities into a development bank composed of both CEC 
Bank and ExIm Bank.  
 
Ø Publically state the mission of a new development bank to emphasize long-term 
investment and coordinate development by prioritizing investments that maximize 
positive external spillovers. 
 
Ø  Standardize prioritization and risk assessment procedures used in program 
selection.   
 
Ø Create a regulating watchdog body to monitor the use of funds by the development 
bank. 
 
Ø Offer time and merit based rewards to attract long-term skilled employees. 
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VI. Appendix 
Figure #1: Percentage of Project Selection (2007-11) and Paid Expenditure (2007-Jan 2013)21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure #2: Number of EU Fund Managing Authorities per Member 
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       Figure #3: Principles for Successful Development Banks22 
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Figure #4: EU Fund Absorption Rates for Eastern Europe - 201123 
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Figure #5: Percent of Total Banking Sector Assets 201324 
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Figure 6: Market Share of Selected DBs in 200925 
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